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This paper is motivated by empirical observations on popular-economy firms (PEFs) in the
informal sector of Santiago de Chile. These are labor-managed firms embedded in popular
milieu where cooperation between their members plays a central role. This paper develops a
(partial equilibrium) microeconomic theory of PEFs. First, it endogeneizes the level of
cooperation between the workers. Second, it develops a static and a dynamic model to analyze
whether embeddedness influences the behavior of the PEF. Embeddedness is assumed to be
captured by three different characteristics suggested by the empirical observations. Most of
them influence the employment and income levels in the PEF.
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It is admitted today that subsistence in the poor areas of Third World cities is possible, partly,
thanks to the development of a wide range of small economic activities created by the people
themselves (retail shops, craftsmen, services...) outside formal economic channels. This
phenomenon has been referred to in recent economic and sociological writings as 'informal
sector', 'underground economy' or 'survival strategies'. This informal sector is clearly
inserted in a popular milieu (in Chile, “poblaciones”, in Argentina, “villas miseria”, in Brazil,
“favelas”). Following an inductive approach, some authors have argued that more consideration
should be given to the embeddedness of these 'informal' economic activities in their social,
political, economic, and cultural reality (Dia, 1991, Hugon, 1996, Rogaly, 1997). As these
authors, we are concerned with the question : Does it matter whether the 'informal sector' is
embedded in a popular milieu? However, our approach is quite different. Starting from
'stylized facts', we develop a microeconomic model to derive the possible implications of
embeddedness. No attempt is made to answer such a broad question comprehensively. First,
we only consider some aspects of embeddedness. Second, we only deal with a specific
segment of the 'informal sector', namely 'popular-economy firms' (PEFs). These are (small)
groups of workers organized as labor-managed firms (LMFs).
This paper first argues that the 'environment' in which an organization is embedded can
influence the type of information agents have and can explain the existence of social norms.
Then, we summarize the relevant information contained in a survey on PEFs in Santiago de
Chile and in a larger survey about 'popular-economy initiatives' in the same area. Some
'stylized facts' emerge about the organizational structure of PEFs (ownership, income
inequalities, degree of cooperation between workers,…) and the link between these firms and
local social networks. The rest of the paper develops a microeconomic theory of PEFs. The
models are based on assumptions motivated by these stylized facts. From these, it is clearly not
possible to derive a unique and non controversial set of attributes characterizing embeddedness
in a popular milieu. Yet, these surveys suggest various plausible assumptions about these
attributes, whose consequences on the behavior of the firm seem worthwhile to analyze.
Although our analysis is limited to the embeddedness of LMFs in a popular milieu and is
developed at a partial equilibrium level only, we hope to contribute to the debate about the
possible importance of embeddedness.
This paper develops both a static and a dynamic model. In the static setting, we start from the
literature on the LMF where the incumbent workers' expected utility is maximized taking into
account the risk of a layoff (the so-called 'ex-ante egalitarian cooperative')
1. As Spinnewyn and- 3 -
Svejnar (1990) and Georges (1994), we take advantage of the close connection between the
modeling of the LMF and the search for efficient contracts in unionized profit-maximizing firms
(PMFs). The static model extends this literature in two directions. First, it endogeneizes the
level of cooperation between the members and the workers entering the LMF. This extension is
motivated by the observation of a high level of cooperation between workers in PEFs. The
model shows that the degree of cooperation between members and newcomers is much higher
in such an organization than in a PMF with so-called 'insiders'. Second, we introduce two
possible dimensions of embeddedness to see whether it influences the behavior of the firm.
Assuming that the hypothesis of symmetric information is more plausible in a dense social
network than otherwise, we show that the risk of a layoff would be efficiently shared between
the members of a PEF. Next, assuming that embeddedness in a popular milieu favors
egalitarianism, we postulate that incumbent and entrant workers should be equally paid and
analyze the behavior of the PEF under this constraint. These two cases are contrasted with the
ones where risk-sharing is ruled out and where entrants are paid their reservation wage.
In a dynamic model, we analyze possible consequences of embeddedness on membership
formation. The surveys point to the existence of close links between the PEF and a preexisting
community and/or a local group. Therefore, we assume that the initial number of members is
concerned with the stream of income but also with the time path of employment and
membership  levels. In steady state, it is shown that all members are employed, some new
workers are hired to replace quits and are immediately considered as members. Moreover, in
steady state the marginal effect of employment on income per worker is negative. This solution
therefore lies between the employment level that maximizes value-added per worker (see e.g.
Vanek, 1970) and the extreme case where the employment level is maximized (Kahana and
Nitzan, 1989). The dynamic behavior of the PEF is also studied.
The literature has since a long time been concerned with the so-called ‘perverse response’ of the
LMF (according to which output and labor demand are inversely related to the output price).
This paper shows that the this ‘perverse response’ is not systematically observed.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 develops the concept of embeddedness.
Section 3 summarizes the empirical observations on PEFs. Section 4 deals with the static model
and section 5 with its dynamic extension. Section 6 summarizes the paper and concludes.- 4 -
2. POPULAR ECONOMY AND EMBEDDEDNESS
The informal sector is a growing reality in Third world cities. For some, this informal sector is
the manifestation of a universal tendency towards entrepreneurship, of a kind of 'barefoot
capitalism' (De Soto, 1987). For others, these economic activities are archaic and therefore
have to disappear over time or are, at best, in need of transformation (Tokman, 1990). Recent
studies in economic micro-organizations of Third World countries highlight the fact that more
consideration must be given to the 'embeddedness' of these economic activities in their social,
political, economic, and cultural reality (Dia, 1991, Hugon, 1996, Rogaly, 1997). This means
that in order to understand these diverse informal forms of economic activity, one must refer to
the social structures and the relational networks with which they interact (Polanyi, 1944,
Granovetter, 1985). Indeed, economic organizations are constructed by individuals whose
actions are influenced, i.e. both facilitated and constrained, by the structures and resources
2
available in the social environment in which they are embedded (Granovetter, 1992).  
Beyond their heterogeneity, the informal economic activities share the context in which they are
embedded, the popular milieu. This milieu is made up of all the inhabitants of peripheral urban
areas who, mostly under precarious economic conditions, develop relationships and modes of
conduct in reference to that space. Sociological studies show that despite the heterogeneity of
the population in these peripheral quarters, these areas have become a genuine identificatory
reference (Salazar, 1991). For this reason, the expression 'popular economy' is being
increasingly adopted in order to highlight the usually neglected embeddedness of these
organizations  (Nyssens, 1994, 1997). The popular economy is therefore the set of different
activities developed by the popular sectors to ensure their subsistence and satisfy their economic
needs (Razeto, 1991).
Razeto proposes two criteria to classify these activities. On the one hand, there are several
different forms of organization : popular-economy organizations, family businesses, individual
initiatives... For Razeto (1991),
"popular-economy organizations (PEOs) are groups of people in a given neighborhood
organized to seek out ways of resolving in solidarity the members’ needs in the areas of
consumption, production and the distribution of goods and services" (p. 84)
On the other hand, within each of these modes of organization, there are several strongly
differentiated levels of development, ranging from survival-oriented activities to activities- 5 -
witnessing substantial growth. Table 1 presents such a classification. To provide more
intuition, each cell of the table contains an example.
Embedding a socio-economic organization in its social and cultural environment is to a large
extent only useful if this provides a better understanding of its functioning. This paper argues
that this is indeed often the case. To develop a rigorous argumentation, we focus on a specific
segment of the popular economy, namely the popular-economy organizations involved in
production, called popular economy firms (PEFs).
A preliminary step is to specify how an economic model could deal with embeddedness. First,
the relational networks in which the organization is located can influence the information
available to the agents. The kind of assumption made (symmetric vs. asymmetric information,
the type of asymmetry) can reflect the social and cultural context in which the organization is
embedded.
Introducing the influence of norms upon agents' behavior is a second way of modeling the
embeddedness of economic organizations. Norms are a set of rules (legal, social, moral, etc.)
shared by a group of people. They influence the choices made by the individual members of
this group. Norms emerge over time in a given social, political, economic, and cultural reality
3.
Norms can impose a constraint on the agents' choices. The equality of wages between
incumbent and entrant workers (the refusal of two-tier contracts) may be viewed as the
consequence of a social norm of fairness (Elster, 1989, Fehr and Kirchsteiger, 1994).
Introducing endogenous variables capturing a collective component is another approach. Simon
(1993) argues that embeddedness in social networks provides perhaps the most important
rationale for introducing non-economic variables into objective functions, especially variables
reflecting some kind of altruism. For example, within the theory of the LMF, Kahana and
Nitzan (1989) have given reasons why the level of employment could have a positive effect on
the utility of the incumbent workers. We shall explore some of these paths in sections 4 and 5.
3. POPULAR ECONOMY FIRMS (PEFs) IN SANTIAGO (CHILE) : SOME BASIC FACTS
This section argues that a large part of PEFs can be considered as labor-managed firms. It also
characterizes the environment in which the popular economy and therefore PEFs are embedded.
This section is based on two sets of data collected in the Santiago metropolitan area : A random- 6 -
sample survey of 50 PEFs supported by the Program of Labor Economics in 1993 (Larraechea,
1994), and a survey on the 4000 popular economy initiatives (popular economy organizations,
family businesses...)  supported by a group of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
(PET, 1992).
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Larraechea (1994) indicates that only 11% of the sampled workers declare that they are in an
employer-employee relation. 85% consider that they are "members" of an enterprise owned by
the workers themselves. This huge majority of "members" motivates our interpretation of PEFs
as LMFs inserted in the popular economy. Moreover, 87% of the workers evaluated the state of
cooperation between workers to be "good" or "very good"
5.
What is the level of development of these PEFs? The data collected by Larraechea (1994)  show
that the average size of PEFs was 6 workers and their average age 9 years. Furthermore, the
mean of a PEF worker’s monthly income was US$ 341. This is relatively high compared to the
alternatives available to workers in the 'formal' economy. This income level corresponds to the
earnings of an employee with a post-high school degree, while only 33% of the workers in the
sample actually reached this education level. This income is a bit lower than that of a technician
in the formal sector, while most of the PEF members could only apply for a blue-collar job.
The survey also shows that income differentials are twice lower in PEFs than in PMFs in the
Santiago area
6.
Larraechea's survey on PEFs gives information about the motivations of the firm to contract a
new worker. For 64% of the firms, economic considerations are relevant. 31% of the PEFs
underlie motivations of solidarity (to create a job for an unemployed person) or ideological
motivations (to contract a worker who shares the same values).
The 1992 PET survey of 4000 initiatives supported by NGOs gives information about the type
of links between members in the popular economy (Table 2). Notice that 40% of the initiatives
are communautarian and 18% associative. The former, but not the latter, grew out of
community circles, indicating that there were strong links among members even before specific
economic initiatives were undertaken. 34% are family microentreprises. The same survey
shows  also  that  60% of the initiatives participated in some local structure of coordination of
popular economic initiatives. This suggests that these organizations are highly embedded in
local social networks
7.
These observations suggest a set of assumptions on which a theory of the PEF could be
elaborated. First, the PEF should be viewed as an LMF. Second, it can be argued that the
assumption of symmetric information is plausible since typically the PEF is so closely- 7 -
connected to preexisting groups and embedded in local social networks. Third, it is plausible
that issues such as the time profile of the size of the PEF or the rules governing membership
formation matters for the current members of a PEF. Finally, the relatively weak income
inequality within PEFs should also be taken into account in our theory. Although these
assumptions are only suggested by the available observation, it seems worthwhile to analyze
their implications at a theoretical level and to confront them with alternative assumptions (to see
whether embeddedness matters). Sections 4 and 5 develop this analysis.
4. A STATIC MODEL OF THE PEF
Assumptions and notations
Let y = (y1,...,yG) be the vector of outputs and nonlabor inputs of a LMF (yg is positive in the
case of an output and negative in the case of an input). Let L be homogeneous labor measured
in efficiency units. The feasible production set is denoted by Y Ì R
G+1. We assume that the
LMF faces given output and input prices, p = (p1,...,pG). Whatever the value of L, the LMF is
assumed to maximize value-added
f L Max py
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By assumption, for a given L, the corresponding subset of Y is compact, problem (1) has a
solution. If this subset varies continuously with L, so does f(L). We assume that Y is convex,
so that f(L) is concave.
We assume that the number of hours each laborer works is identical and fixed after
normalization to 1. In addition, as in Lindbeck and Snower (1988), we distinguish the number
of employed members ("insiders" or "incumbent workers"), Li, and the number of entrants, Le,
where entrants are "outsiders" who enter the firm. The number of employed insiders, Li, has to
be lower or equal to the initial number n of incumbent workers. In this section, n is exogenous
(this assumption is relaxed in the next section). We assume that there is no upper bound on the
number of entrants, Le,. Let ai and ae be endogenous parameters that transform a given number
of workers (or hours of work) into a quantity of labor input measured in efficiency units.
Hence, L = ai.Li+ae.Le. We assume that ai and ae are nonnegative and bounded from above- 8 -
(say, ai£1, ae£1). As in Lindbeck and Snower (1988), ai and ae can be seen as the level of
cooperation respectively between insiders and between insiders and entrants. As in Lindbeck
and Snower (1988), insiders, the "experienced" workers, are the only ones who are able to
engage in cooperation activities. Therefore, it is assumed that both ai and ae are under the
control of the incumbent workers. These workers can incur a disutility from their cooperation
activities with entrants. This approach is not developed in this paper (but well in Nyssens,
1994). In this paper, for expository reasons, we simply assume that these cooperation activities
involve a cost of training which is proportional to the number of entrants and to the degree of
cooperation ae. In this way, cooperating with entrants is seen as creating a loss of value added.
As will soon be clear, this approach leads to easily interpretable results. To simplify the
exposition, cooperation between insiders is costless. Hence, ai = 1.
If employed, the incumbent workers' income is C1. Their utility is U(C1). We assume U'>0
and U''<0. If fired, incumbent workers are assumed to work in another firm, where they earn
an exogenous wage w. w is assumed to be lower than the maximum possible value-added per
worker, i.e. maxL f(L)/L. This assumption is compatible with the results of Larraechea (1994)
mentioned in section 3. We assume that workers have no access to financial markets. Hence,
risk-averse workers prefer a labor contract that insure them against income fluctuation. In a
context of symmetric information (about this assumption, see Section 3), we will consider the
possibility that the LMF pays a compensation C2 to laid-off insiders. The results with and
without this compensation will be contrasted. The possibility of an insurance mechanism
establishes a link between our model and  the implicit contract approach (see Rosen, 1985, for a
survey).  One difference should nevertheless be emphasized, namely that we envisage risk-
sharing between employed and laid-off insiders for a given 'state of the world' i.e. for a given
function f. Put differently, the LMF faces a budget constraint conditional on the realization of
f.
8 Let Ce denote the compensation paid to entrants (Ce ³ w).
In a seminal paper, Law (1977) assumed that the number of employed as well as income per
worker enter the objective function of a LMF. In Steinherr and Thisse (1979) and several more
recent papers, the probability of being laid off is by assumption the same for each worker.
Therefore, it is rational to assume that the LMF  maximizes the expected utility of a
representative member. As long as the initial number of insiders, n, is exogenous, the
maximization of a utilitarian objective is strictly equivalent. In this paper, we adopt the latter
approach and assume that the objective function of the LMF writes :
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This objective function clearly introduces a trade-off between the income and employment
levels.
This objective is maximized under a set of constraints. In addition to the ones already
mentioned, one constraint says that earnings and compensations paid cannot exceed the value-
added generated by the production activities minus the loss due to cooperation :
CL C n L CL faL aL k aL i i ee ii ee ee 12 .. ( ) .( .. ) . . +- +£ +- , (2)
where k is the constant nonnegative marginal cost of cooperation. This constraint will always
be binding. It can be seen as a zero-isoprofit function. Therefore, our problem can be
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The first-order conditions of this problem are presented in Appendix 1.
To analyze these conditions, we first assume that n is large enough, so that maintaining a job
for each insider is not desirable (given that C1 must be higher than or equal to w). In that case,
whatever the value of ae there will be no entrants since hiring outsiders implies a cooperation
cost. The case with and without layoff payments will be contrasted. We will next consider a
small enough membership n, where hiring outsiders will be optimal. The model (2)-(6) implies- 10 -
immediately that Ce = w. We deal with this case but also with the one of the egalitarian PEF
where an additional constraint, C1 = C e, applies as a consequence of a social norm. Between
these high and low values of n, a third region will appear where all insiders keep their job and
no outsider enters the firm. This decomposition in three regions is also present in the modeling
of LMFs in Spinnewyn and Svejnar (1990). It is a standard result in PMFs, too (see, e.g.,
Carruth and Oswald, 1987 and Lindbeck and Snower, 1988).
(i) The case where some insiders are laid off
For sufficiently large values of n, we know that at the optimum, some incumbent workers will
be fired and no outsider will enter the firm. The first appendix shows that at the optimum C1 =
C2 + w. Therefore the utility level of employed insiders equals the one of the laid-off ones (this
is the case of the ex-post egalitarian LMF)
10. It follows that f'(Li) = w. This means that the
utilization of labor is efficient. Furthermore, the level of C2 is given by :
Cn f f w w f w 2
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which is positive
11. Hence, Cw 1 > .
The properties C1 = C2 + w and f'(Li) = w are also found in the implicit contract theory
literature under symmetric information (see Rosen, 1985) where risks are efficiently shared
between a private firm and a pool of risk averse workers endowed with a utility function
equivalent to the one assumed here. Yet, the assumption of symmetric information looks more
plausible in a LMF embedded in dense social networks than in other types of firms.
The optimal solution (7), C1 = C2 + w, f'(Li) = w,  Le = 0 is found as long as n ³  fw '()
- 1 . In
Figure 1, this boundary value is denoted by nA and A is the optimal solution.
INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
If, for whatever reason, laid-off insiders cannot be compensated (C2 = 0), one easily derives












1 (8)- 11 -
which simply says that (C1, Li) is on the contract curve. This curve has the same interpretation
as in Mac Donald and Solow (1981). It is the set of tangency points between isoutility and
isoprofit curves. When C2 is fixed to zero, the contract curve starts at the competitive
equilibrium (f'(Li) = w) and is upward sloping (see the curve CC' in Figure 1). The optimal
(C1, Li) is at the intersection of the contract curve and the budget constraint (2) which simply
writes C1 = f(Li)/Li. This solution is indicated by point B in  Figure 1. It is the optimal one as
long as n > nB in Figure 1. As can be seen from this figure, the employment level is lower when
C2 is positive : nA < nB. If compensating laid off insiders is impossible, the only way risk averse
workers can partially insure against the utility loss of layoff is by hiring a number of incumbent
workers in excess to what would be efficient (on this issue, see also Rosen, 1985). It is
immediately seen that risk averse insiders prefer that ex-post utility be completely insured by the
PEF (C2 > 0).
(ii) The case where outsiders are hired
 If the number of entrants, Le, is positive, all insiders are necessarily employed (Li = n). In
addition, the marginal cost of hiring an outsider must be equal to its marginal productivity:
Ck aa f n a L ee e e e += + '( ), (9)
where Ce = w. The latter is only positive if ae, the degree of cooperation with entrants, is itself
positive. However, if Le is positive, cooperation has to be maximal (ae = 1), a result in sharp
contrast with the optimal behavior in PMFs with insiders (where the optimal value of ae is its
lower bound, see Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). This result is shown in Appendix 1
12 and is
compatible with empirical observations (see Section 3).  
The number of entrants, Le, is given by (9) where ae = 1. The total number of workers is
denoted by nC in figure 1, of which nC - n are entrant workers. The insiders wage is determined
by the budget constraint (2) :
C wk nf f wk wk f wk 1
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where the bracketed difference is positive
13 and therefore C1 > w+k. In this case, the PEF
implements a two-tier system where outsiders earn their reservation wage w and insiders
benefit from a higher income defined by (10). The optimal solution defined by (10), Li = n, ae =
1, Ce = w and f'(n+Le) = w+ k is observed for all n lower than nC.- 12 -
The literature on union-firm bargaining has argued that two-tier systems are not often observed.
This argument is presumably even more plausible in the case of a PEF (see Section 3). It is
therefore necessary to consider another reference case where a strict equality between C1 and Ce
is imposed. Under this hypothesis, the budget constraint can be rewritten as :
C









This expression can be substituted in (9), taking into account that ae = 1 and Ce = C 1. Carrying

















which is an implicit equation in Le. Should k be zero, the solution to (19) would simply be the
employment level that maximizes value-added per worker (point E in Figure 1), i.e. the
optimum found in the first generation of literature on LMFs (see e.g. Vanek, 1970).
Let nD  be the solution of equation (12) for Le equal to zero, i.e. let nD be the solution of :
fn f n n k DD D '( ) ( ( )/ ) -= .
For all n lower than nD, at the optimum, Li = n, Le solves (12), C1 = f'(n+Le) - k, ae = 1 and Ce
= C 1. Given that w is assumed to be lower than the maximum of f(L)/L, it is clear that C1 is
higher than w for sufficiently low values of k.
 (iii) The intermediate case
Between the boundaries nD or nC and nA or nB, the number of insiders is such that each of them
is employed in the PEF. No outsider enters the firm because the marginal increase of value-
added they create is insufficient to compensate the marginal cost they impose to the PEF.
Hence, C1 = f(n)/n. Clearly, the range of values of n where this outcome is observed varies
according to the assumptions made (a two-tier system or an egalitarian wage system where
insiders and entrants are equally paid; the presence or the absence of a compensation to laid-off
insiders).
Up to now, the possible consequences of embeddedness have been developed along two
directions. First, embeddedness matters if, because it is located in a dense social network,- 13 -
information is symmetric and a PEF can insure laid-off insiders while another firm cannot
14. If
this condition is verified, everything else equal, the income of the laid-off workers will be
higher and the employment level will be lower in the PEF. Second, if a dense social network
favors income equality between insiders and entrants, the total level of employment (insiders +
entrants) will be lower in a PEF compared to another LMF. This assertion holds if two-tier
systems are implemented in the latter organization.
Before we envisage other dimensions of embeddedness in a dynamic setting, we show in
appendix 2 that in many cases the PEF does not develop the so-called perverse response
property which since a long time has worried the literature on LMFs. This perverse response is
only observed  in the case where n < nD, insiders and entrants are equally paid and the marginal
cost of cooperation, k, is sufficiently low.
5. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE PEF
Assumptions and notations
This section endogeneizes the number of members of the PEF, n. The appropriate setting to
deal with this question is clearly dynamic. We are interested in the optimal path and steady state
properties. Previous intertemporal models maximize the present value of income per worker
(see Näslund, 1988, Caputo, 1992, Georges, 1994). Consequently, they ignore risk aversion
and the possibility of layoffs. Therefore, in these papers, the employment level only influences
preferences through its effect on income per worker. To avoid these limitations, this section
assumes a utilitarian LMF (as in the static model). In each period t, the firm is concerned with
the well-founded following objective :
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Due to space limitation, we cannot consider each of the hypotheses made in the previous
section. We assume that laid-off insiders, if any, do not receive a compensation and we rule out
two-tier wage systems (C(t) is the compensation paid to the insiders instructed to work and to
the entrants, if any). The first assumption is not crucial since it will turn out that all insiders are
employed in the neighborhood of the steady state. The latter assumption is motivated by the
stylized facts summarized in section 3. Moreover, it makes a comparison with the traditional
LMF literature easier.- 14 -
We consider an infinite horizon model with forward-looking agents. In a continuous-time
setting, the instantaneous objective (13) is integrated over a period [0,+µ). This means that the
initial number of insiders n(0) is concerned with the stream of income C(t) but also with the
time path of the insiders' employment and membership levels (respectively, Li(t) and n(t)). The
same assumption has sometimes been made for unions (see Kidd and Oswald, 1987, Jones,
1987, and Jones and McKenna, 1994). Yet, it seems more plausible in the case of an embedded
PEF, where the links with a preexisting community and/or a local group appears very often (see
Section 3).
Conditional on n(0), the PEF chooses a time path for the numbers of insiders and entrants and
for the cooperation level between insiders and entrants, ae. The number of members, n(t), is the
state variable. Its level is influenced by a fourth control variable which measures the share of
the laid-off insiders (respectively, of the entrants) who loose their membership (respectively,
become a member of the PEF). More specifically, we assume that the equation of motion for
the state variable (i.e. the membership formation rule) writes :
n
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where m(t) is a control variable and q is an exogenous and constant quit rate capturing relevant
aspects in a dynamic setting such as mortality, migration or retirement
15 (0<q<1). The first
expression on the right hand side of (14) means that the number of members decreases because
of quits. The second expression captures the influence of layoffs and recruitments on
membership. If Li(t) < n(t), what matters is the number of insiders who are fired and would
otherwise have survived (and similarly when Le(t) > 0). Notice that these flows are multiplied




The LMF in the present model solves the following dynamic problem :
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where n0 is a given positive constant, r is the discount rate and f(.) is defined by (1). Any
solution of (15) should meet the additional constraint C ³ w. To simplify the exposition, we
shall not impose this inequality which adds little insight to this analysis.
The current-value Hamiltonian H and Lagrangian L  associated with problem (15) are
H L L m a L U L L a n L U w qn m q L L n
LLm a H LLm a n L m
ie e i iee i i e
ie e ie e i
(,,,, ) ( (,,) )( ) () ( ) ( )
(,,,, , , ,) (,,,, ) ( ) ( )
gj g
gxVl g x V l
º+ - + - + - + - []
º+ - + - +
1




þ ï a e
(16)
gxVl ,,, being time-dependent multipliers defined on R+. The first-order conditions for
maximizing  L are presented in Appendix 3. Various properties are easily derived from these
conditions. First, as in the static case, outsiders enter the firm if and only if all insiders are
employed. Moreover, when outsiders enter the firm, the cooperation level, ae, is equal to its
upper bound (the proof of Appendix 1 is still valid here). Finally, the Lagrangian is linear in m.
Therefore, m = 0 or m = 1.- 16 -
Properties in steady state
Before we consider the dynamic behavior of the system, let us look at the steady state
conditions.  The  n
·
= 0 condition implies that mq L L n q n ie () ( ) 1 -+ - =  or, if










. It is obvious that m cannot be zero. Hence, m = 1.
Therefore, nq L i =- () 1 , which implies a contradiction, namely that  nL i <. Consequently,
Ln L ie => ³ 00 and . The n
·
= 0 condition becomes then  mq Lq n e () 1 -= , which only








In steady state, all insiders are employed and some outsiders are recruited to replace those who
quit. The conclusion is therefore that only one of the three regimes found in the static model can
be a steady state in a model with quits.
17 From this property and Appendix 3, the
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. The left-hand side of (18) is negative and is simply the
marginal rate of substitution between income (consumption) and membership (employment for
the insiders) evaluated at the steady state. To see this, one has simply to differentiate expression








the particular case where cooperation is costless (k = 0), the right-hand side of (18) has a
straightforward interpretation. It is simply proportional to the marginal increase in income per
worker as membership increases. So, (18) implies that in steady state the employment level
(i.e. members plus entrants) is such that this marginal increase in income is negative. This
property derives from the preferences of the LMF where the path of employment matters. In- 17 -
general, i.e. when k > 0, the marginal increase in income per worker is reduced because
enlarging membership involves a cooperation cost.
The steady state defined by (17) and (18) is apparently similar to point B in Figure 1 (equation
(8) of the static model). For, in both cases, the outcome is defined by the tangency point
between a downward-sloping "iso-preference" curve and the value-added per head curve
(corrected  for the cooperation cost). However, the two solutions are genuinely different. In
point B, conditional on n, some insiders are fired and for this very reason employment matters
for the utilitarian PEF. Here, all insiders are employed, some outsiders are hired to replace quits
and the employment level of insiders can matter to the utilitarian PEF because membership is
now endogenous.
In the second part of Appendix 2, the so-called 'perverse response' of labor-managed firms is
reconsidered in the steady state. It is shown that the 'perverse response' is not a general result.
This 'perverse response' is more unlikely the more risk averse individuals are.
Dynamic analysis around the steady state
As far as the dynamic behavior of the system is concerned, three possible situations should be
distinguished. They correspond to the three cases introduced in the static model of Section 4.
We here focus on the dynamic behavior of the system in the neighborhood of a steady state
(where, Li(t) = n(t) and Le(t) ³ 0). Moreover, to simplify the analysis, we ignore cooperation
costs (k = 0). Appendix 3 linearizes the equation of motion for g () t. Figure 2 gives the phase
diagram corresponding to this linearized equation and the equation of motion (14). The  n
·
= () t 0
locus is upward-sloping and the  Le
·
= () t 0  locus is downward-sloping. The arrows indicate
directions of motion. There is therefore locally a unique saddle point path SS converging to the
steady state. The dynamics of employment are implied by the path SS. Assume an initial level
of membership such that all insiders are occupied, n(0) in Figure 2. The initial value of Le,
Le(0), is read off SS. As m = 1 in a neighborhood of the steady state, these entrants become
members. So, n(t) starts increasing and the number of entrants becomes lower until the steady
state is reached. There, the number of entrants is just enough to compensate quits.
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Figure 3 illustrates the adjustment process after a (small) unanticipated permanent rise in the
output price (p0 in Appendix 2). Let us focus on the case where this rise increases employment.- 18 -
The n
·
= () t 0  locus is not affected and the  Le
·
= 0 locus shifts to the right. In Figure 3, the new
saddle point path is SS. The initial equilibrium is (n,Le) = (N,l). The path of adjustment is
composed of a jump at time 0 from (N,l) to (N,l') and a movement over time from this point to
the new steady state (N",l"). Here again the initial rise in employment is made of entrants who
become members, so that eventually the number of insiders is higher (N" > N). So does the
number of entrants (l" > l).
In this dynamic setting, the possible consequences of embeddedness have been developed by
endogeneizing membership formation. Since the links between the PEF and a preexisting
community and/or a local group appears very often (see Section 3), we have assumed that the
initial number of insiders n(0) is concerned with the stream of income but also with the time
path of the insiders' employment and membership levels. In steady state, it is shown that all
insiders are employed, some outsiders are hired to replace quits and membership adjusts
immediately. The chosen objective function is such that in steady state the marginal effect of
employment on income per worker is negative. This solution therefore lies between the
employment level that maximizes value-added per worker (see e.g. Vanek, 1970) and the
extreme case where the employment level is maximized (Kahana and Nitzan, 1989).  Finally,
there is locally a unique saddle point path converging to the steady state.
5. CONCLUSION
Would a better understanding of the relationship between the behavior of firms and their social
and cultural environment throw light on the socio-economic performances of different regions
or countries? A full answer to such a broad question is obviously beyond the scope of a single
paper. Economists need tools to deal with this relationship between the behavior of economic
agents and their social and cultural environment. We have argued that this environment could
shape the type of information agents have and could explain the existence of social norms. So
doing, we have introduced a link between this environment and concepts economists are able to
manipulate. Next we have applied these ideas to a specific case. We have considered a
particular segment of the informal sector in the slums of Santiago de Chile, namely popular-
economic firms (PEFs). From surveys, it turns out that these are labor-managed firms
embedded in local social networks, showing a small degree of income inequality and
characterized by a high level of cooperation between workers. These 'stylized facts' have been
used to formulate assumptions about the information set of the agents and about social norms.- 19 -
Finally, we have developed a (partial equilibrium) microeconomic theory of the PEFs from
which it can rigorously be deriveds whether these assumptions influence its behavior.
This analysis shows that embeddedness typically matters. First, it matters if, because it is
located in a dense social network, information is symmetric and a PEF can insure laid-off
insiders while another firm cannot. Under this assumption, everything else equal, the income of
the laid-off workers will be higher and the employment level will be lower in the PEF. Second,
if a dense social network favors income equality between insiders and entrants, the total level of
employment (insiders + entrants) will be lower in a PEF compared to another LMF. This
assertion holds if two-tier systems are implemented in the latter organization. Third, if the links
between the PEF and a preexisting community and/or a local group implies that the initial
number of members is concerned with the stream of income per worker but also with the time
path of employment and membership levels, then the total level of employment lies between the
employment level that maximizes value-added per worker and the extreme case where the
employment level is maximized. An other interesting result is that the degree of cooperation
with entrants is maximal in the PEF, while in PMFs, incumbent workers enhance their market
power by developing the minimal level of cooperation with entrants (see Lindbeck and Snower,
1988).
Our analysis is limited to LMFs in a popular milieu and the stylized facts have only been
suggested by data. Neverthless, we hope to have contributed to the debate about the possible
importance of embeddedness on socio-economic organization. We suggest further analysis in
two directions. First, we advocate that other dimensions of embeddedness should be studied
with the standard tools of economics. The concept of 'social capital' is an example (see Harris
and De Renzio, 1997). Second, appropriate data should be collected in order to test the
predictions derived from this type of theoretical exercise.- 20 -
APPENDIX 1
This appendix develops the first-order conditions of problem (3)-(6). Assuming Li>0, C1>0
and Ce>0, at an optimum there exists zlnx ³³³³ 0000 ,,, such that :
UC UC w f L aL C C ie e () ( ) ' ( ) 12 1 20 -+ [] ++ - + [] -= zx (A1)
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(i) The case where some insiders are laid off
For sufficiently large values of n, at the optimum, Li<n and Le=0. Equations (A2) can be
rewritten as :
UC '( ) 1 0 -= z (A8)
If C2 > 0, equation (A3) is equivalent to :
UC w '( ) 2 0 +- = z (A9)
Hence, C1 = C2 + w. Substituting this result in equation (A1) yields f'(Li) = w.
(ii) The case where outsiders are hired
To see that ae = 1 when Le > 0, we have to show that, for a given level of product ae Le, the cost
of hiring entrants, (Ce Le + k ae Le ) , is decreasing when ae  increases. If Ce is exogenous (Ce =





























It can easily be checked that the conclusion is the same if Ce = C 1. Notice that the level of
cooperation is also maximized  in PMFs where the firm chooses the level of ae.
APPENDIX 2
The static model
The first generation of literature on LMFs shows that these firms perversely respond to price
incentives i.e. labor demand is inversely related to the price of the output (see e.g. Ward,
1958). To simplify the exposition, let us consider a LMF producing a single output with two
inputs only (labor and capital). We shall now consider how the PEF demand for labor varies
with changes in its output price, when other prices are held constant. For this purpose, let f(L)
= po Q(L,K) - r K be the value-added function with po, the price of the output, K, the given
stock of the capital, r, the cost of the capital and Q(L,K), the production function assumed to be
concave. f(L) is then concave.
To analyze the impact of an increase of the output price, po, on the level of employment, (Li,
Le), we shall successively consider each of the three cases introduced in the analysis. In a first
step, we assume that the firm stays in the same region after the increase of the output price. We
later relax this assumption.
(i) The case where some insiders are laid off
If C2 is allowed to be positive, the number of workers is determined by  pQ L K w oL i (,) =. We












which is positive since Q is concave. If
compensating laid-off insiders is impossible, the optimal solution is, as shown in the core of
the text, at the intersection of the contract curve (8) and the budget constraint which can be
written as C1 = (poQ(Li,K)-rK)/Li. Differentiating totally these two equations  yields :
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The left-hand side of (B1), denoted M below, is negative since C1 is greater than w and U is
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The left-hand side is positive since we are in the region where p oQ L(Li,K)  is lower than
(poQ(Li,K)-rK)/Li and Q(L,K) is concave. The right-hand side is obviously positive.
Therefore, when there is no insurance mechanism, the impact of an increase in the output price
implies an increase in the number of employed insiders too.
(ii) The case where outsiders are hired
Two cases must be considered (with two-tier contracts and with an egalitarian wage system). If
two-tier contracts are allowed, the number of entrants is determined by the equation















since Q(L,K) is concave. The number of entrants is then positively related to the output price.
When the wage system is egalitarian (insiders and entrants are equally paid), the number of
entrants is determined by equation (12). Differentiating totally this equation with respect to Le
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The right-hand side is positive since Q(L,K) is concave. Being in the region where n < nD, we
know, by (12), that :
















Then if k n > r K, the left-hand side is positive. Otherwise, the LHS is negative. Therefore, the
impact of an increase of the output price on the number of entrants, in absence of two-tier- 23 -
contracts, depends on the importance of the cost of the capital. It will be negative if this cost is
high, otherwise positive.
(iii) The intermediate case
If the firm is in the intermediate case and stays between these boundaries  (according to the
assumptions made, nD or nC and nA or nB) an increase of the output price does not change the
employment level. Indeed, employing  all the insiders and hiring no outsider is still the optimal
solution.
But the boundaries shift following an increase of the output price. Therefore, regime shifts can
be observed. It can easily seen that the boundaries, nA, nB, nC move to the right. Therefore,
when a two-tier system prevails, if the initial membership is higher than but sufficiently close to
nC the firm increases employment (instead of a status quo). In a sufficiently small neighborhood
of nA (resp., nB), the employment level is completely unresponsive to output price increases. In
the absence of a two-tier system, nD (instead of nC) is the relevant boundary. After an increase
of the output price, nD shifts to the left if kn < rK, otherwise to the right. Therefore, under the
assumption of an egalitarian wage system and for an initial membership lower than but
sufficiently close to nD, the firm keeps employment unchanged or hires outsiders after an
increase in the output price.
An important implication of this model is that the firm does not display a perverse supply
behavior except in the case where n < nD, insiders and entrants are equally paid and when kn <
rK. In that case only, the firm hires less entrants when the output price increases. The
intermediate zone is characterized by a status quo in employment (all insiders are employed and
no outsiders enter the firm), the firm absorbing the shocks through income fluctuations. This
was already noticed by Steinherr and Thisse (1979) and Spinnewyn and Svejnar (1990).
The dynamic model
Let us now deal with the so-called 'perverse response' to output price in steady state assuming
that k = 0 (hence, jf (,, ) ( ) LL L L ie i e 1 º+ ).
18 As above, assume that the value-added function
is f(Li + Le) = po Q(Li+Le,K) - r K where po is the price of the (single) output, K is the
exogenous level of the capital stock and Q(Li+Le,K) is the concave production function. It is































and . (B3)- 24 -
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< and ). The right-hand side
has however an ambiguous sign. From (B4), the sign of 
dn
dp0




















































This implies that the 'perverse response' is not systematically observed. This 'perverse
response' is more unlikely the more risk averse individuals are.- 25 -
APPENDIX 3
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(15). It is easily seen that jj 12 01 ³" Î [] ,, a e , with a strict inequality if k > 0.
In steady state, n
·
= 0 and g
·
= 0. The n
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5). Since in steady state ma e == 1 , the equalities (C2) = 0 and (C3) = 0 can be used to rewrite
the g
·



































After some manipulation, this equality leads to (18).
The dynamic behavior of system (15) can be derived the equation of motion (14) and from
(C1), (C2) and (C6). Assume k = 0. In a neighborhood of a steady state,
gg f f f
·
=+ - + + + + () ( ) () ( (() () ) ) () '( (() () ) ) ' (() () ) t r q t U nt L t ntU nt L t nt L t ee e . (C9)
Equating (C3) to zero yields an expression for g () twhich can be substituted in (C8). The latter
becomes then :
Yt rY qU nt L t e
·
=+ +- + () ( ) ( ) ( (() () ) ) 11 f , (C9)
where  Y(t) is a compact notation for Ynt L t e ( ( ), ( )),
withYnt L t ntU nt L t nt L t ee e (() , () ) () ' ( (() () ) ) ' (() () ) º++ ff. Linearizing Y(t) around the steady
state solution (n, Le) allows to rewrite (C9) as :
Lt
Y
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where  Yn U nL nL n U nL nL ee e e 2
2
0 =+ + [] +++ < " ( () ) ' () ' ( () ) " () , ff f f  since  UU ', ", >< 00
f "( ) nL e +< 0  andYY U nL nL ee 12 0 =+ + + < ' ( () ) ' () ff . The Lt e
·
= () 0  locus is downward
sloping. Figure 2 gives the phase diagram corresponding to (C10) and (14).
Up to now, we have neglected the transversality conditions. However, as the current-value
Lagrange multiplier g () t and the current-value Hamiltonian converge towards finite values, it is
easily checked that the transversality conditions are satisfied.- 27 -
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Table             2            :            Distribution             of            initiatives             by              member           status                     (          Source:            PET          ,                       1992)
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Figure 3. The effect of an increase in output price (the case wiyhout 'perverse response')
                                                
1 See among others: Steinherrr and Thisse (1979), Brewer and Browning (1982), Bonin (1984), Kahana and
Nitzan, (1989, 1993), Spinnewyn and Svejnar (1990).
2 Resources are the means available in the environment for the setting of an economic activity : human and
material capital but also "social" capital  (networks of social relations, trust, social norms...); for a survey of
this concept, see Harriss and De Renzio (1997).
3 Various streams of economics have studied the influence of norms. For the economists of conventions (see e.g.
Dupuy et al , 1989), norms take the form of 'conventions', i.e.,  regularities which flow from social interactions
but appear to the actors in the form of an unquestionable constraint. For the 'new institutional economics' (see
e.g. Willliamson, 1985, and North, 1986), norms are an agent's efficient answer to the problem of transaction
costs in a context of imperfect information. A lot of arguments have been raised against this view. Authors like
Elster (1989) or Granovetter (1992) have argued that norms are not outcome-oriented.
4  These PEFs and popular economy initiatives receive different kind of support : credit facilities, consulting,
advices,…
5  6% evaluate it to be neither good nor bad, 2% bad or very bad and 4% did not answer the question.
6 Other analyses of various samples of LMFs reach the same conclusion (Bartlett et al, 1992 ). We are aware that
the available observation is insufficient to test whether PEFs develop two-tiers contracts or not (since we do not
have individual data with personal characteristics such as tenure and education).
7 Along the same line, some empirical studies show that labor-managed firms have stronger links with the local
community than PMFs (Bartlett et al, 1992).
8 Due to a limited access to financial markets, the PEF cannot diversify risks. This model differs from the one of
McCain (1985) in three ways. First, McCain considers the ex ante problem of a LMF facing a distribution of
'states of the world'. Put another way, his function f is state-contingent as in the standard implicit contract
literature. Second, McCain rules out any risk-sharing between employed and laid-off insiders. Third, he
endogeneizes  the number n of members in a static setting (in section 5, we deal with this issue in a dynamic
one).









                                                                                                                                                       
10  It should be noticed that less simple conclusions would be reached in the case of a more general utility
function (see Rosen, 1985, in a related context).
11  This is true because f is concave and w is assumed to be lower than the maximum possible value-added per
worker. These hypotheses imply that the point (' () , ) fw w
- 1  is on the right of the maximum of the value-
added per worker function. In that region, it can be easily seen that (7) is positive.
12  An interior solution could be found if the cost of cooperation was not proportional to the product ae.Le. This
result would still be at variance with the one obtained in the model of a PMF developped by Lindbeck and
Snower (1988).
13 Because f is concave, this is true if w+k< max (f(L)/L), i.e. for sufficiently low values of k.
14 Instead of opposing the case with layoff payments under symmetric information and the case without such
compensation, we could have compared the former and the case with layoff payments but asymmetric
information. The basic conclusion that income and the allocation of labor are different would have typically been
unchanged  (see Rosen, 1985, or Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, in the context of PMFs).
15  This quit rate is not endogeneized here since this analysis does not focus on the determinants of the
underlying phenomena.
16 It is implicitly assumed that in each period entrants are actually newcomers who needs some costly
cooperation from the insiders in order to become productive. Furthermore, it is implicitly assumed that an
entrant agrees to become a member if m(t) > 0. As long as C(t) > w, this is certainly the case for it will turn out
that nobody is fired along the path towards the steady state as soon as outsiders enter the PEF.
17 For the equivalent result in a PMF, see Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992). If we take the limiting and less
realistic case of no quits, the full range of equilibria found in the static case are steady states of the model.
18  Relaxing this assumption of zero cooperation costs leads to rather complicate expressions and an ambiguous
net effect of the output price on the steady state employment level.